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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
When a president assumes office

the public expects him

to perform three major functions:

to set the nations policy

agenda according to his position,

to be the symbolic leader

of the

nation,

and to

make the "machinery

perform his programs as he

wishes.1

of government"

As recent presidents

have discovered, this final task is not easily accomplished.
Control over
dent,
that

bureaucracies is

as well as Congress,
bureaucracies play

Many of

the decisions

important for

a presi

because of the tremendous role

on the

nature

and rules

of public

they make

policy.

become policy.

Their influence is tremendous.
The many

bureaucracies within

are not easily brought under

the federal

government

control by the president,

person elected to be the the Chief Executive of

the

tive

do

branch.

Presidential

possess tools which

administrations

can be used to exert

the

execu
however

some control over

executive branch agencies.

lrrhomas E.
Cronin,
"'Everybody Believes in Democracy
Until He Gets to the White House...': An Examination of
White House-Departmental Relations," in The Institution
alised Presidency,
Norman C.
Thomas and Hans Baade,
eds., Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.:
Oceana Publications,
1972,
p. 147.
1

Americans, however, are somewhat fearful of an
tive with too much control over
Heclo says a "problem...of
want a bureaucracy

the bureaucracy.

It is as

relative dilemmas."2

that is responsive to

execu

For they

demands,

but not

one that will be so responsive as to be willing to engage in
illegal activities.
The controls they possess

are therefore limited,

legally, some by the nature of the tool.
comes

nebulus and fleeting,

some here,

some

Control then

be

some there,

very

often not for long over any one agency.
Many suggestions

exist to

of the executive branch.
tive,

while

improve the administration

Some suggest weakening the execu

others would strengthen

it.

Some

have been

tried, but perhaps the political environment at the time was
wrong.

Ultimately,

moves for improved administration must

be made.
The political and culture
upon presidential attempts to

environment that exists acts
be the "Chief Administrator."

This environment consists of a populace

that

wants

some,

but not total control, a system that in which power is frag
mented, and instruments of control that are limited.

2Hugh Heclo, A Government of Strangers, Washington, D.C.:
The Brookings Institute, 1977, p. 5
2

Chapter 2
TOOLS OF CONTROL
Three major

reasons exist

for presidential

gain control of the bureaucracies under him.
assures that his programs will
he wishes.

desire to

First, control

be implemented in the manner

Nixon believed, rightly so, that much of the day-

to-day decisions
decisions.

made by agencies

Therefore, he,

were

substanial

policy

like other presidents,

desired

greater control over agencies.^
The second

reason for desiring

control is

the efficiency of operation of government.

to improve

As "Chief Admin

istrator," a president should have a concern for the general
operations of the agencies under him.
Finally,

from time to time,

government becomes political.
campaign on their
trator, e.g.

the issue of operation of

Presidential candidates will

skills and experiences

Carter and Reagan.

cannot get his policies and

Further,

as

an

adminis

a president who

programs into operation will be

politically criticized.
An interrelatedness can be
The thread

that appears to run

seen between these reasons.
between them is

the proper

implementation of presidential policies and programs.

For a

^Richard Nathan, The Administrative Presidency, New York:
John Wiley and Sons, 1983, p. 44.
3

president to be seen as
icies and

the leader of the nation, his

programs must

be carried out.

But how

pol
does a

president gain control of the many agencies under him?
The primary step

in the process is for

he cannot control it all.

Rather,

him to realize

he must concentrate his

efforts on those areas he is most concerned with/1
has realized this,

Once he

he can begin the task of exercising con

trol over those areas.
A president has

four general tools for

control of the agencies under him:

first, control over the

organization of the executive branch,
personnel,

third,

control over

increasing his

second,

budgeting,

control over
and

finally,

the executive branch

provides

personal persuasion.

2.1

REORGANIZATION
The ability to organize

the

president

Organizational

with

a

major,

ability

provides

though

overused,

immediate

and

tool.

long run

advantages
The organization
such significant
FDR

of the executive

branch has

concern that almost every

formed a commission

to study its

been of

president since

operation and organ-

^Stephan Hess, Organizing the Presidency,
Washington
D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1976, pp. 147-148.5
5Seidman, Harold,
Politics Position and Power::
Dynamics of Federal Reorganization, Second Edition,
York: Oxford University Press, 1976, p. 76.
4

The
New

ization.^

The Brownlow Commission of 1937 was the forerun

ner of these.

Recommendations from the commission included

"an executive

fully responsible for

bureaucracy."7

Most

follow

course,

the same

the management

of the subsequent
recommending

of the

commissions would
a strong

executive

role.
Reorganization is
It

can be

used to

of great importance to

achieve

greater

a president.

coordination

realignment of several agencies into one agency.
used to eliminate

or bypass agencies or

mittees which would slow
used to

down

change the emphasis

downgrading others.
interest groups.

Congressional com

of programs,

Finally,

It can be

initiatives.

It can divert
it can

through

It can be

upgrading some,

power away from certain
be used to

create new

units under the president to enhance his position.8
Following along the lines of the last possibility,
based

on the

through the
Branch.

Brownlow
most massive

recommendations,

Roosevelt

reorganization of

and

pushed

the Excecutive

In this reorganization the the Executive Office of

the President (EOP) was formed, giving the president a staff
to better deal with the bureaucracy.

^Hess, Organizing the Presidency, p. 144.
7 Ibid., p. 185.
O
Seidman, Politics, Position, and Power, pp. 25, 95, and
Robert E. DiClerico, The American President, p. 145.
5

In 1971,

Nixon attempted a similarly large

ation of the executive branch.
tions of the Ash
reorganization of

Council,

Based

on

the

reorganiz
recommenda

Nixon's recommendations included

seven existing

Cabinet departments

four "goal orientated Superagencies"—

into

Human Resources, Com

munity Development, Natural Resources, and Economic Affairs.
Essentially, this created a three tiered hierarchy, with the
White House staff and select Cabinet heads above the remain
der of the Cabinet.9
This follows the traditional management suggestion of a
narrow span of control in order for the executive to be able
to excercise

more control over

perspective, this is sound.
cannot operate purely on

each.

However,

From

a

the executive branch

management principles.

organization of the federal

management

The

re

government is political action,

political interests must be given consideration.
Political interest

groups,

and agencies (the traditional
restructuring.

They

Congressional

Committees,

"Iron Triangle")

opposed the

feared

the

disruption

of

their

Eventually, the reorganization plan was dropped.

Nixon

traditional support structures.

opted instead for unofficially
the

original

proposal.

This

organizing his Cabinet along
was

done

by

giving four

Cabinet Secretaries the additional title of Counselor to the
President.

Under this title, each headed a Cabinet council9

9Seidman, Politics, Position, and Power, pp. 111-117.
6

made

up

of

the

departments

that

to

were

have

been

merged .10

2.2

PERSONNEL
The presidential

into two

parts,

civil

Staff personnel.

personnel function
service personnel

not the cane.

prevent a

separated

and White

House

Ostensibly, the president is in charge of

the the entire civil service staff.
ality is

can be

The

However, this in actu

system is structured

president from excerising

too much

as

to

control over

civil servants.
The civil servant, in this position,

has a unique role

vis-'a-vis presidential leadership for:
Unlike archetypal "bureaucratic man" interested in
protecting existing operations and organizations,
the civil servant is supposed to be responsive to
the legal authority of political heads.
Unlike
pure "political man" the civil servant has a
re
sponsibility that is institutional
and enduring,
whoever the political figures
in charge may
be.11
As a result

of

this,

any

particular

civil

servant's

responsiveness to changing political demands will be mixed.
In order to gain better
system,

control over the civil service

many moves toward reform have been made.

cently, Carter presented a package of reforms.
was for
into two

the separation of
boards A

of the Civil

second reform was

Most re

One proposal

Service Commission

the formation

10 Nathan, The Administrative Presidency, pp. 51-52.
^Heclo, A Government of Strangers, p. 21.

of

a

Senior Executive Service.
rate boards,
president,

The first

act created two sepa

one as a personnel office under control of the
the Office of Personnel Management

(OPM),

.
other as a neutral hearing board for employee grievances.

By

making OPM a

presidential staff agency,

it

was

the
12

hoped

that he would be able to exercise more control over it.
The second action,
suggested as

a needed

their positions,
by most recent
programs.
hands on

the formation
action since

of an SES,
1935.

had been

Because

of

senior level civil servants have been seen
presidents as keys to

the administration of

Their "expertise, their managerial skills, their
understanding of

the internal

operations of

the

executive branch, and their enduring relationships with Con
gress" are valuable property to a president.14

Therefore,

"recent presidents often

way to so

have gone out of their

licit the loyalty and support" of these officials.15
The

first major

goal of SES was to improve the rela

tions between appointed and career bureaucrats.
lieved that

by lessening

the difference

It was be

in their

status,

12 David R.
Beam,
"Public Administration is Alive and
Well— and Living in the White House," Public Adminis
tration Review, 38(January/February 1978T: 74.
15C. Calvin Mackenzie, "The Paradox of Presidential Per
sonnel Management," in Hugh Heclo and Lester Salamon,
eds., The Illusion of Presidential Government, Boulder,
Colorado: Westview Press, 1981, pp. 124-129.
14Ibid., p. 123.
15 Cronin,
"'Everybody Believes in Democracy'" in Thomas,
The Institutionalized Presidency, p. 147.
8

friction would be lessened and
was believed that this

in

greater

trust

exuded.

It

turn would further "the policy

making and implementing capacities of federal agencies."161
8
7
A second

goal of

the SES,

following the

lines

of

greater accountability, was the enhancement

of

to remove poor performers

Incentives also

were placed in

from office.1'"

the system.

The threat of

the ability

removal being a

negative incentive, top level performers were offered incen
tives as well.
Finally,

the SES was instituted in hopes of separating

senior careerists
create a

from any one

agency.

By

attempting to

loyalty to something other than one agency, it was

felt senior

careerist would be

the previously
would develop a

less likely to

defined "Bureaucratic Man."
feeling of separation and

function as

Instead,

they

distinction from

the rest of the system. 18
The second

part of the president's

personnel function

is directed toward the White House staff.
viously,

the

executive led
the President.

As mentioned pre

Brownlow Commission advocation of

a

to the formation

Office of

of the Executive

strong

It is over this group of people that a pres

ident is able to use his strongest control.

16 Peter S. Ring and James L. Perry, "Reforming the Upper
Levels of the Bureaucracy," Administration and Society,
15(May 19B3): 121.
17 Ibid., p. 123.
18 Mackenzie, "Presidential Personnel Administration," in
Heclo and Salamon, Presidential Government, p. 129.
9

In his personal staff, a president's foremost desire is
detachment from

outside interest. ^

president

people who will

support him and his policies

a

wants

and who offer

the best advice from the perspective of the White House.
It has been suggested that the degree to which a presi
dent concentrates power in the White House staff compared to
the

institutional agencies

is reflective

perceptions of the bureaucracy.1
20
9

of his

personal

Richard Nixon's case is

a clear illustration of this.
In his first term,

Nixon developed an entire "counter

bureaucracy" within the White House responsible for the same
areas

as the

institutional bureaucracies.

This was

to

compensate for what he felt was an unwillingness on the part
of

the career

bureaucrats

to

implement

his

Aberbach and Rockman found that Nixon did, in fact,
majority of bureaucrats

whose

beliefs

policies.
face

differed from

a
the

Nixon administration's policy goals.21
By mid-1972 though, the administration had become aware
that the
tion.

"counter-bureaucracy" technique was not
An inordinate

administrative details.

amount of time was
Also,

the

the solu

consumed by small

"counter-bureaucracy"

19Robert J. Sickels, Presidential Transactions, Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, T57T^ p^ 33.
20Hess, Organizing the Presidency, p. 152.
21Joel D. Aberbach and Bert A. Rockman, "Clashing Beliefs
Within the Executive Branch:
The Nixon Administration
Bureaucracy,"
American Political
Science
Review,
70(June 1976): 459, 466-467.
10

began obscuring lines of authoriy,

giving the advantage to

careerists who had a better understanding of the system.2-2
Bridging the gap
House

staffers

appointees.

are

between the careerists and
the

Cabinet

the White

and sub-Cabinet

level

Each Cabinet secretary is suppose to be an ex

tension of the administration's policies in that agency.2
2
23*
2
5
A strong

group of officers in

substantial difference

the Cabinet can

in an administration.

function,

not

merely as advisors

to the

rather as

individual department heads within

make a

They should

president,

but

a coordinated

admini stration.
Politically, it is advantageous for a president to have
such a strong group of

executives.

willing to grant administrative

Congress has been more

powers to department secre

taries, whom they must approve, than to presidents. 2^
Among potential
for

people who

strong personal
are

flexibile,

duty.

secretaries,

are among
stability,
thicked

other
a

should look

things persuasive,

have

"broad-gauged" intelligence,

skinned,

It appears that often,

who come closer

a president

and

have

a

sense

of

a president finds people

to fitting this high request

in his second

22Nathan, The Administrative Presidency, pp. 40-41.
23 Louis C. Gawthorp, Bureaucratic Behavior in the Execu
tive Branch; An Analysis of Organizational Change, New
York: The Free Press, 1969, p. 47.
2ZtHess, Organizing the Presidency, p. 183.
25 Ibid., p. 194.
11

round of appointments, when
cerns.

he owes

less to political con

Often this second group comes from

and staffers who have proven

undersecretaries

their abilties to the adminis

tration.26
The

Reagan

brought in a

administration,

upon

strong concern for lower

cials as well.

entering

level Cabinet

Changing from his predecessor,

Cabinet Secretaries to make

offi

who allowed

these appointments,

administration placed that function

office,

the Reagan

within the upper levels

of the White House staff.27
The Reagan

administration also acted to

appointees from the classic problem

protect their

of "marrying

the

na

tives," where an appointee takes on the perspective of one's
department rather than the administration's. To combat this,
Cabinet and

sub-Cabinet appointees learned about

ture departments

from conservative task forces

their fu
rather than

departmental personnel.
This
ty."28

was "to

assure and

maintain ideological

puri

By learning about their departments and their posi

tions from outsiders, it denied department personnel a crit
ical

point

of

indoctrination

influence.
can present

The

people

the department

in
in a

perspective than the department personnel.

26Hess, Organizing the Presidency, p. 186.
27Nathan, The Administrative Presidency, p. 76.
28Ibid., p. 75.
12

charge

of

different

2.3

BUDGETING
The principle

institutional staff agency

the president for controlling the
of

Management

and

available to

bureaucracy is the Office

Budget (OMB),29

For

the

executive

branch, budgeting goes beyond the simple allocation of money
to each agency, for budgeting power is a fundamental base to
program control.30

It is a means to bring "order and regu

larity to public decisions." 31
OMB was created in 1921 as a way of centralizing budget
request.

(It was then known as

the Bureau of the Budget.)

With the formation of the Executive Office of the President,
it was moved from the

Treasury Department to directly under

presidential control. With this move, a Division of Adminis
trative Management was
research improvements

added.

This division's goal

in administrative techniques

was to
and ad

vise government agencies about management practices.32
This change, based upon Brownlow Commission recommenda
tions,

radically

federal government.

changed the nature
No

of budgeting

longer was there the

for the

situation of

29 Allen Schick, "The Problem of Presidential Budgeting,"
in Heclo and Salamon, The Illusion of Presidential Gov
ernment , Boulder, Colorado, 1981, p. 87.
30'Lewis C.
Mainzer, Political Bureaucracy, Glenview,
Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1975, p. 86.
31

39

•
Schick, "Presidential Budgeting,’ in
Heclo and Salamon,
Presidential Government, p. 91.

Marver H. Bernstein, "The Presidency and Management Im
provement," in Thomas, The Institutionalized Presiden
cy, pp. 79-80.
13

"the president serving the

purposes of budgeting,

It

instead,

budgeting became "an instrument of presidential power."33
Budgeting as a tool of
basis of limiting budget

requests by agencies uncooperative

with the administration.
requests,

control functions on the simple

Additionally,

through budgeting

the administration can gain information regarding

what an agency

is doing.

As the central

receiver for all

executive agency budget requests, OMB is therefore the focal
point of this tool.

Agencies, aware of OMB's willingness to

cut, will increase, or "pad", their request in order to min
imize the effects.
actual

The avenue of appealing to Congress, the

allocator of

funds,

is

also available

to

agen

cies. 3^
It has become

a trend for recent

presidents to insti

tute some new budgeting technique as the way to cure budget
ing problems,
System,

e.g.

Johnson's

Planned

Nixon's Management by Objective,

Based Budgeting.

Program

Budgeting

and Carter's Zero

Each found mixed success as both a budget

ing technique and as a tool of control.35

33 Schick, "Presidential Budgeting," in Heclo and Salamon,
Presidential Government, p. 88.
O/
4 Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of The Budgetary Process,
Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1983, p. 23.3
33

Carol Weiss, "Efforts at Bureaucratic Reform, What Have
We Learned," in Carol Weiss and Allen Barton, eds.,
Making Bureaucracies Work, Beverly Hills, California,
1977, p. 19.
14

PPBS was

perhaps the best conceived

budgeting control

tool. Originating in the Department of Defense, PPBS was de
signed for

the executive

to discover

about each

agency's goals and projects.

as much

as possible

Comprehensive in

design, it required
agencies to
spell out
assumptions,
project
achievements over time, alternatives,
marginal
gains from further expenditures, and the costs of
a program over time, in precise, quantitative
form.36
MBO was not a budgeting tool per se,
with the consequences of actions.

but was concerned

It was geared toward con

tinual feedback of information in the system, readily react
ing toward change.
aspect

of

MBO

Like PPBS,
was

though,

its emphasis

the most important

on the results

of pro-

grams. 37
J
MBO

was

early 1973.

introduced by

the Nixon

admministration in

It was their final attempt at strengthening the

executive's power

toward the bureaucracy.

was supposed to give the

administration more information on

the activities of agencies.
results was supposed

This technique

Further,

to enhance

its concentration on

the effectiveness of pro

grams. 38

36Ma inzer, Political Bureaucracy, p. 87.
37Richard Rose, Managing Presidential Objectives,
York: The Free Press, 1976, pp. 61-62.
38Ibid., p. 58.
15

New

Beyond

MBO,

the

Nixon administration

strong role in reshaping OMB.
Ash Council what
organized into

p.layed a

On the recommendation of the

had been the Bureau of the
OMB,

very

with an

Budget was re

alledged greater

emphasis on

management to go with the new title.
A layer

of political

appointees,

known

Associate Directors, or Pads, was added,
ing the office.

as

Program

further politiciz

The Director's office was

moved into the

White House and when Roy Ash became the Director,

the addi

tional title of Assistant to the President was added.39
ZBB

was

Carter's

through budgeting.

attempt to

Normal

bring

greater

procedure had been for an agency

to present only new expenditures to OMB for review.
to bring about

a systematic review of

expentiures as well.^0

control

ZBB was

all existing program

In theory, each year,

all

expend

itures would have to be justified.
A second
ance.

function OMB plays

Originating

budget from
tional funds,

as a means

is in

legislative clear

for protecting

agencies going directly
it eventually became

to Congress

the overall
for addi

the process for forming

the legislative program of the administration.^*1

39

Ash had been the chair
cil .

of the aforementioned Ash Coun

^°DiClerico, The American President, Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1979, pp. 122-123.
^Schick, "Presidential Budgeting," in Heclo and Salamon,
Presidential Government, p. 106.
16

Legislative clearance simply is that all proposals from
every executive agency must be

cleared through OMB in order

to maintain continuity of programs.

OMB's option for clear

ance are approval at varying degrees of support;

return the

proposal to the agency for reworking, often through negotia
tions with OMB; or outright rejection of the proposal. ^2

2.4

PERSONAL PERSUASION
The final

internal one:
tempt to

tool possessed

personal persuasion.

convince bureaucrats

wants of them

president is

an

Persuasion is the at

"that what

is what they ought

and on their own authority."
ed,

by the

the White

to do for their

House

own sake

A president, it is suggest

must deal with the bureaucracy

in much the same way as

he deals with Congress and other outside groups/*4
A
sources.

president’s
First,

persuasive

powers

come

from

the constitution position and

several
powers as

chief executive, carries with it a certain level of respect.
Beyond that,

is the status accorded the office and the

ficeholder by the general populace.

of

Finally, the access the

DiClerico, The American President, pp. 128-129.
Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power: The Politics
of Leadership with Reflections on Johnson and Nixon,
New York: John Wiley and Sons, 19T5, p 102.
James J. Benze,
"Presidential Management: The Impor
tance of Presidential Skills," Presidential Studies
Quarterly, ll(Fall 1981):477, and Peter Woll, American
Bureaucracy, New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1963,
p. 159.
17

president has to the public, through the media, gives him an
additional pressure power.^
The

most important

holding the office.

aspect,

though,

is

the

person

The president must be able and willing

to convert these generalities into specific directed powers.
This means the
decisions,

and to exercise all

What is trying to be

or ’won' on the

of the

or to

tools at his dis

developed is loyalty among the

people beneath the president.
"be gained

to make difficult

willing to put pressure on others to act,

not to act,
posal.

president must be willing

If it
basis of a

is to occur,

highly personalized

approach."4 64
6
5

45 DiClerico, The American President, p. 359.
46 Gawthorp, Bureaucratic Behavior, p. 143.
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it must

Chapter 3
LIMITS OF CONTROL
For all the tools that are available to a president, it
would be unrealistic to suggest that, even if a president so
desired,

controlling the

remotely possible.

vast number of agencies

Instead,

he must use

the

resources with care, addressing only those areas
necessary to be

was even

controlled for the well being

available
he sees as

of his poli

cies and programs.
Even if a president chooses to concentrate
agencies, success will still be limited.
factors

which

reduce his power.

nature of the system,
agencies have

and

on

There

certain

are

many

There are limits in the

his management tools.

an array of tools to counteract those

Further,
of the

president.

3.1

NATURE OF THE SYSTEM
The system,

an ever strong
executive power.
not been

despite the twentieth century trend toward
executive,

is designed to

prevent ultimate

The public, in the post-Watergate era, has

willing to

grant total

over the executive branch.

control to

the president

Checks and balances exist within

the system.

19

Perhaps the greatest check is one that was not designed
in, but occurs in all bureaucracies,

inertia.

act is always easier than to act positevly;

"To fail to

that is,

it is

easier to maintain the status quo than to change it. "47
Inertia is

not totally bad.

Most of what

is accom

plished by agencies today is done through inertia.^8
result,

the administration does not

have to concern itself

with the day-to-day administrative details.
some change is

As a

desired inertia becomes a

However,

when

formidable adver

sary.
For a careerist, inertia falls easily into place.
have the privilege of the ability
tration and its changes.
tration is not the inertia

Most

to

one adminis

distressing for an adminis

of the careerist,

in its appointed department heads.
ists,

outlast

Most

They,

like

but inertia
the career

become attached to their way of doing things and see

any change as an afront to them/*9
The design of
tial control.

the system also acts

to limit presiden

Characterized by fragmentation, no one entity

is able to gain the upperhand over another for long.

Agency

heads are responsible not only to the president, but also to
Congress

and

their

clients,

their

staffs,

and

selves. 50
^7 Woll, American Bureaucracy, p. 161.
AO
,
Rose, Managing Presidential Objectives, p. 13.
Gawthorp, Bureaucratic Behavior, p. 207.
50Neustadt, Presidential Power, p. 107.
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them

The fragmentation
where

the divisions

of the
within

system creates
the

executive

"semiautonomous operating subunits" from
istration.5^

Therefore,

necessary for

any lasting presidential

immediate drawbacks arise.
for

a situation
branch

are

the elected admin-

cooperation with Congress appears
influence.5
52
1

Two

First, in allying with Congress

bureaucratic control, the president must accede some of

the desired control to Congress.
Second,

nothing exists to

prevent a threatened agency

from forming its own allegiance against the president.

This

may be with Congress and/or the organized clientele an agen
cy serves.
Legal checks
control.

also exist which prevent

Congress,

which authorizes

funding for all agencies,
influence.
as required

can

total executive

the organization and

place limits on presidential

These limits can come in the form of such things
funding and/or approval

of appointments

to an

agency.
The sheer size

and complexity of the

makes it impossible to be controlled.
and the

executive branch

The number of people

varying organizational structures assures

that any

effort will be altered as it passes through the system.

51Gawthorp, Bureaucratic Behavior, p. 143.
52Woll, American Bureaucracy, pp. 161, 165.
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Because its
arise.

size and complexity,

problems

One is the time requirement.

tration that attempts to exercise

of control

Even for an adminis

control over only certain

areas, the time commitment is high, and,

time is not always

available for such matters.
As mentioned
that trying

before,

the

to control the

Nixon administration

entire bureaucracy

found

through the

development of its own "counter-bureaucracy" consumed a tre
mendous amount of time.

Time that was also needed for other

areas.
A

second result

of

the enormous

size

is the

large

amounts of information that is needed to operate each execu
tive branch

agency.

There is no

staff can possibly oversee the

way a president

and his

entire amount of information

that passes through a bureaucracy.

Add to this,

that much

a technical

sort that

the bureaucracies that

are under

of the

they may not

information is of

comprehend,

the fact

the same branch as the president, are quite independent.
Not
mation of
tainted by
only

only is

a president

the bureaucracies,

but what

the bureaucracy.

certain information

unable to see all the infor

It

he does see

may decide to

and with a

can be

pass along

definite bias in

its

favor.S'}

Anthony Downs,
Inside Bureaucracy,
Brown and Company, 1967, p. 116.
22

Boston:

Little,

Another structural limitation on
many independent
branch.

the president is

agencies nominally

The president's

within

control over these is

over any other executive agency, hence,
Yet,

these agencies,

the

through their

the

executive
lower than

there independence.
actions,

have direct

effects on presidential programs.5^
A final

structural constraint

is the

served by the president and his staff.
civil servants know
tration.

3.2

term of

office

As mentioned above,

that they can outlast

any one adminis

As a result, they can be less willing to change.

LIMITS ON PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL TOOLS
Tiie presidential tools for

control are not omnipotent.

They carry with them weaknesses which limit their potential.

3.2.1

Reorganization
Reorganization has become overemphasized

for control.
"Rare indeed

The trend is

to "organize" a

is the Commission

as a cure-all
problem away.

or presidential

task force

with the self-restraint to forgo proposing an organizational
answer to the
matter of

problems it cannot solve." 55

"sterile box

shuffling" rather

It becomes a
than trying

develop creative solutions to management issues.

5^Gawthorp, Bureaucratic Behavior, p. 68.
5jSeidman, Politics, Position, and Power, pp. 3-4.
56 Ibid., p. 13.
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to

Problems come with any attempt to reorganize the execu
tive branch.

Nixon's aforementioned reorganization attempt

shows the problems such actions face.

Political considera

tions must be given in any attempt.

Three strong groups ex

ist which often combat such moves:

the affected agency, the

clientele of

congressional committees

the agency,

and the

tied to them.
These groups have strong,
one another.

established connections with

A reorganization move which would potentially

distrupt these ties

would be considered detrimental

three.

they would act in concert to oppose the

Therefore,

by all

move.
Abolishing an agency is the hardest reorganization move
to accomplish.57

Here,

there is a direct,

visible threat

to the established grouping.

3.2.2

Personnel
The head of

the placement
ed.

the executive branch's power

to influence

of people in postitions beneath him is limit

Control over

both

civil servants and the people

he

appoints is difficult.
Careerists have the power of tenure. They receive their
positions,
tions,

not based on any

but based on merit.

political affliations or posi
Despite recent reforms,

removal from office remains difficult.

5/DiClerico, The American President, p. 125.
24

their

Because of this situation, their loyalty is often ques
tioned.^8

Are they loyal to the administration,

they loyal to their agency, their own job,

or,

are

and their clien-

tle?
Aberbach
works for has
liefs. 59

and Rockman

found

that

an agency

a strong relationship with

For instance,

they found

his political be

that,

their survey, the majority of administrators,
party,

official

at the time of
regardless of

opposed any reduction in current government expendi

tures .fl0‘
Even the

appointment power is not

problems surround it.
the

Senate.

The

absolute.

First, appointees must be approved by

Constitution requires

heads receive confirmation.

This

that all

Cabinet

requirement has been ex

tended to other executive agencies as well.
izing legislation,

Several

In its author

Congress can require confirmation of the

appointed head.
They will even extend
agencies.
tion of

the requirement into established

When Congress was concerned with the politiciza
OMB,

they passed

legislation

requiring

that the

director's position be confirmed.5
0
6
*
8

58 Gawthorp, Bureaucratic Behavior, pp. 131-132.
59-Aberbach and Rockman, "Clashing Beliefs," pp. 464-465.
60 Ibid. , p. 461.
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Because of

the confirmation process,

question of who the appointee
has the power to make any
Yet,

there

becomes a

is responsible to.

Congress

confirmed appointee report to it.

the official is a member

of the executive branch,

an

appointee of the president.
A second problem with the appointments is the dual role
of agency heads.

They are

expected to be administrators of

their agencies, but they also are asked to be political
visors

to the

mix.61

president.

The two

roles

Should administrators concern

do not

ad

always

themselves with the

day-to-day operations of their department or, do they act as
an advisor to the administration?
heads

be

appointed

should they be

for their

For a president,
administrative

picked for there political

should

skills

prowess?

or,
Is it

possible to find people who are capable in both?
A more

likely question though

is,

is it

possible to

find people who are capable in even in one of the above cat
egories and are willing to serve?
an attractive position to many.
fices they may

not

One

of the require

post-Watergate era is the dis-

personal finances.

unwilling to do this,
of the

It requires of them sacri

be unwilling to make.

ments that came about in the
closure of

Government service is not

Many executives

may be

necessarily because of the fear

uncovering of wrong doings, but because

of business

61Bernstein, "The Presidency and Management Improvement,"
in Thomas, The Institutionalized Presidency, p. 92.
Mainzer, Political Bureaucracy, p. 91.
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considerations.

Another

Top executives in

deterrent to some is

the private sector would

the salary.

take a substan

tial cut in order to serve in a government position.
Just because

the president

appoints an

does not mean he can remove them at will.
dependent regulatory
terms.

commissions enjoy

official,

Members

of

the right

it
in

to fixed

These terms do not correspond to president's so, not

only can a pesident not remove people he places, but he also
has to deal with appointees of his predecessor.
Removal

of other

appointees

Adminisitrative considerations
an official.
enough problem.

also presents

must be given

Continuity within

problems.

when removing

departments is

a serious

Forceful removal tends to "aggravate an al

ready existing organizational problem."63
Dismissal also creates political problems.

Any forced

removal may reflect badly on the president.

If the depart

ment

organizations,

official had

strong

ties

those remaining could be very

within his

reactionary toward the presi

dent, further aggravating his problems.
Even when a president is able to find willing,
people,

he cannot

be assured of their

The problem of "marrying

continuing loyalty.

the natives," or becoming

vocate of the agency's position

Gawthorp, Bureaucratic Behavior, p. 65.
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an

ad

rather than the administra

tion's, is substantial for an administration.

(10

capable

Several factors come to play in causing this situation.
First,
sort of

the agency may co-opt

the appointed head.6,4

"courtship," the agency

head of the importance of what

will

try to

In a

convince the

the agency does,

the way it

does it, and who it serves.
Second,

the

appointee in

most cases

pre-identification with the agency. ^5

will have

some

Someone who is will

ing to serve as the head of the agency must have some inter
est in what it does.

To

follow the wedding analogy,

they

have to like the looks of the groom.
Also, many cabinet appointments are made to placate po
litical interests

rather than for

Often the head will come from

administrative purposes.

an outside group that is con

cerned with the actions of that agency.

So,

natives"

"marrying a

becomes more

often a

case of

"marrying the
close

cousin."
Outside forces also
advocate of the agency.66

will pressure a head
These

vant congressional committees and

to become an

forces include the rele
the interested clientele,

the "groomsmen for the wedding."
Finally,

incentives exists within the organization for

them to take its side.
Republican administrators

What Aberbach and Rockman say about
can hold true for

Republican and

6^ Nathan, The Administrative Presidency, pp. 30-31.
65 Ibid ., p. 30 .
66 Ibid., p. 32.
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Democratic appointees as well:
Unless they are strongly predisposed to ignore the
claims of their agency constituents or to see
events
through
deeply... ideological
lenses
.. .administrators are likely to be absorbed by
the day-to-day problems with which their agencies
deal. 67
A limited tenure
Political appointees
less than

two years,

pastures.^8

of his appointees hurts
on the

average serve

leaving

a president.

a term

federal service

of just

for greener

This short term does not allow them much time

to learn the processes of their office,

let alone institute

any type of change.
White House staff as a tool is not without its problems
either.

It can become counterproductive.

An enlarged staff

will tend to weaken the powers of a president's cabinet.

By

overprotecting the president his staff

and cabinet will en

gage in a

president.

competition for

seeing the

officials position is weaker and by

Cabinet

not being able to

see

the president will be further eroded

67Aberbach and Rockman, "Clashing Beliefs," p. 466.
68

69

Bernard Rosen,
Holding Bureaucracies
York: Praegar Publishers, 1982, p. 19.
Hess, Organizing the Presidency, p. 153.
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Accountable New

3.2.3

Budgeting
The presidential budgeting tools

also.

have a limited effect

The implementation of PPBS, MBO, and ZBB, can all be

criticized.
image,

The processes were used to create a "leadership

not to excercise

direction and control."

0

These

tools were in essence been oversold as a cure all:
The standing of management improvement has also
been undermined by the common tendency to exagger
ate the usefulness of various tools and skills em
ployed by analysts. New management tools have been
oversold, propagandized, and undermined by over
expectations and by insufficient attention to spe
cific operating problems and situations....71
OMB's management position
criticism.
goal.72

Management

is very weak and

becomes

a slogan

subject to

rather

than

a

The traditional budgeting process overshadows the

management process so

that management at OMB

lacks "direc-

.
tion, character, confidence, leadership
and purpose."'7 3

70Ronald Randall,
"The Presidential Use of Management
Tools From PPB to ZBB," Presidential Studies Quarterly,
(Spring 1982):192.
7LBernstein, "The Presidency and Management Improvement,"
in Thomas, The Institutionalized Presidency, p. 91.
72 Randall, "Management Tools," pp. 192-193.
72 Larry Berman, The Office of Management and Budget and
the Presidency,~T9 21-1979,~Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press‘d 1979, p. 115.
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3.3

TOOLS OF THE BUREAUCRACY
The discussion above reveals several of the instruments

available to

the bureaucracies in

the executive

thwart presidential control efforts.

First,

branch to

as mentioned

before, the power of tenure allows careerists the opportuni
ty to wait out an administration.

They are in permanent po-

sitons, facing transients in the executive branch.
The factor of

time aids bureaucrats not

dealings with the president,
pointees.

only in their

but also with presidential ap

In a two year period, few administrators are able

to fully grasp the complexity of their office, let alone try
to initiate many major changes.
Bureaucrats also are able to
to their advantage.

use the fragmented system

They can use Congress and their clien

tele groups to pressure the president.
Congress against itself.

The option of using the president

against Congress is even available.7^
cy has "powers"

They also can divide

As long as the agen

that "stem from sources

independent of the

of the president, the stronger it will be..."75

The vast

ness and complexity of the executive branch can be converted
into a tool by bureaucrats.

Because of its size, no admin

istration can hope to oversee

it in its entirety.

they must opt for concentrating

Rather,

their efforts on particular

areas, allowing the remainder of the departments to operate,

Woll, American Bureaucracy, p. 160.
75Neustadt, Presidential Power, p. 110.
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for the most part, with very little focused attention.
Corresponding to the size of
the tremendous amount of

the executive branch,

information that agencies generate

and administrations must deal with.
to every presidency.
into his mind.

Information is primary

"A president is helped by what he gets

His first need is information." 7()

Not only

in the amount of information, but in its complexity

do

reaucrats find a tool to resist presidential control.
expertise allows them to present

way

that may

conceal

certain

points and

others.

76

bu
Their

material in such away that

the generalist in the administration cannot comprehend,
in a

is

Neustadt, Presidential Power, p. 221.

or,

highlight

Chapter 4
WAYS TO IMPROVE ADMINISTRATION OF THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCH
Many proposals
tration of

directed toward improving

the executive branch

have been

the adminis

offered.

Some

suggest that the best administration of the federal bureauc
racy would
dent.

be one with a

very limited role for

the presi

However, Americans want a bureaucracy that is respon

sive,

although

not

absolutely,

to

their

elected

when these ambivalent feelings

are com

executive.77
As a result,

bined with the position of

groups desiring a weak executive

for their own benefit, any action toward a strentghened exe
cutive will be tempered in the political arena.
likely to change

unless some crisis situation

This is un
occurs which

could generate calls for an extremely strong executive role.
This

should not

preclude moves

toward improving

the

president's position within the executive branch. The presi
dent is in

the best position to give direction

ernment's bureaucracies,
courts.78

Therefore,

to the gov

more so than the Congress

or the

improvements shaped in the political

77Heclo, A Government of Strangers, pp. 4-5
78Dwight Ink, "The President as Manager," Public Adminis
tration Review, 36(September/October 1976):
510 and
Nathan, The Administrative Presidency, p. 10.
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process, can be beneficial.

4.1

CABINET OR WHITE HOUSE STAFF?
The first issue that must be resolved is who to rely on

for administrative

leadership.

Cabinet

appointments

are

often made for political reasons rather than management con
siderations.

The White House staff is picked for their loy

alty to the administration and its policies.
On the other hand,
inherent problems.
more important

over reliance

The staff tends

to see its position as

and reliable to the

they will try to eliminate,

or

on staff has its own

president.

Therefore,

at least reduce the impact,

that any one else has on the president.
The careerists

within the bureaucracies tend

negatively toward a very powerful staff.
staff tries
they will

They feel that the

to undercut their position. '7
tend to react

negatively

to react

to

Sensing this,

most

presidential

initiativesinstituted through his staff.
Further,
agencies.
terial,

agency

heads have

They have control

over

more power

to administer

the men,

money, and ma

and possess the legal authority through Congress to

manage the agency.

A

president's position,

therefore,

should be better served by a strengthened Cabinet.
to

have

this strengthened

Cabinet,

certain

precautions

'"ink, "The President as Manager," p. 512.
9°'Seidman, Politics, Position, and Power, p. 81.
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In order

should be taken:
1.

Select Cabinet officials for
rather

than

terest.

for

their management skills

the appeasement

of

political in

A caution to follow here is that success in

private sector management does

not assure success in

public sector management.

Their operating environ-

ments

Therefore

are

different.

should be given to people

consideration

experienced in public sec

tor management.
2.

The Reagan training example should be followed.
partment heads should be
ment by people
attempt

orientated to their depart

other than from the

to thwart

"marrying

the

department in an
natives."

then, is not a depoliticized process.

When at all possible,

appointed

connected with groups that

This,

Rather, poli-

tics must be allowed to penetrate the operation.
3.

De

82

heads should not be

have direct concerns with

the operations of that agency.
In return for supporting
president should require

the appointed officials,

a commitment from them

the administration

for a specified

period of

commitment creates

greater stability in

the

to stay in
time.

This

the administration

and shows careerists that they will have to deal with an adOO

ministrator for longer than the typical two year tenure.8
1

81

Nathan, The Administrative Presidency, pp. 82-84.

82 Ibid., p. 85.
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Presidents must rely
the various agencies.

on the people they

select to run

They must be relied upon to make de

cisions for the administration.

Therefore,

they should be

allowed to decide upon who will fill the appointed positions
within their department.8^
This power

should not be unrestricted.

choices made should require the
tion.

Rather,

the

approval of the administra

These positions are where much of the the management

operations of the departments occur.
assured that
tions.

there are

The president must be

competent managers

in those

posi

The people appointed to these positions also should

receive orientation to the department

and the position from

people outside the agency.
Because of

the greater

reliance that

upon them by the administration,
accountable for

placed

Cabinet heads must be held

their departments.

that they are given a strong

will be

The trade

must be

rein of control over their de

partments .
This results in a complicated balancing act for the ad
ministration.

To control the departments, they need strong

heads who will be held accountable.
the

heads must

be given

To be held accountable,

some control

independent of

the

88Frederic V. Malek, Washington1s Hidden Tragedy:
The
Failure to Make Government Work, New York:
The Free
Press, VT7Q, p. 81TI
8^Ink, "The President as Manager," p. 514.
^Hess, Organizing the Presidency, p. 154.
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Presidents must rely
the various agencies.

on the people they

select to run

They must be relied upon to make de

cisions for the administration.

Therefore,

they should be

allowed to decide upon who will fill the appointed positions
within their department.8^
This power

should not be unrestricted.

choices made should require the
tion.

Rather,

the

approval of the administra

These positions are where much of the the management

operations of the departments occur.
assured that
tions.

there are

The president must be

competent managers

in those

posi

The people appointed to these positions also should

receive orientation to the department

and the position from

people outside the agency.
Because of

the greater

reliance that

upon them by the administration,
accountable for

placed

Cabinet heads must be held

their departments.85

that they are given a strong

will be

The trade

must be

rein of control over their de

partments .
This results in a complicated balancing act for the ad
ministration.

To control the departments, they need strong

heads who will be held accountable.
the

heads must

OO

be given

To be held accountable,

some: control

independent of

the

Frederic V. Malek, Washington's Hidden Tragedy:
The
Failure to Make Government Work, New York:
The Free
Press, 15781 p7 851

8^Ink, "The President as Manager," p. 514.
oc
Hess, Organizing the Presidency, p. 154.
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president.
portance.

The indoctrination training is then of vital im
Heads must be made aware of and accept the admin

istration's policies, aims, and programs.
Strengthening the Cabinet's position does not eliminate
the need for a a good strong staff.
is a staff who does not

What a president needs

monopolize his time and isolate him

from the rest of the executive branch.86

Rather, he needs

a personal staff that is just that, personal.
The White House
trative purposes.
unbiased advice
what they feel

staff should not be

used for adminis

The staff's role should be for providing
to the

president.

Advice

is in the best interests

which reflects

of the administra

tion and the nation.
In picking his

personal staff,

a president

should be

careful to avoid picking people which "mirror his personali
ty," for this tends to "accentuate

rather

than

compensate

for his weaknesses".

If staffers are to be relied on

advice,

should be

the president

perspectives.
chosen

who

A

caution here

given advice
is

that

from

staffers must

87

many
be

will accept the administration's choice when it

differs from their own.

86

for

Seidman, Politics, Position, and Power, p. 76.8
7
Ibid., p. 80.
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4.2

THE "M" IN OMB
The Office of

Management and Budget continues

to hold

the position as the principle institutional arm available to
the

president for

bureaucratic control.

What is

needed

though, is a much greater emphasis on the "M" in OMB.
When the Bureau of the
in 1970,

Budget was transformed into OMB

the premise was that

there would be a greater em

phasis on the management role apart from budgeting.88
has not occurred.

In part,

the Watergate scandal.

OMB1s

However,

and at no time after has

This

image was tarnished by

even prior to Watergate,

OMB appeared to fully exercise its

management arm.
For the presidency to
needs the
trol.

exercise managerial control,

institutional office to

use its

managerial con

The managers in OMB are, for the most part,

ists who

are

supposed

tions.

The

careerists

to aid

the transitory

should

possess

it

a

career

administra
good

working

knowledge of the system.
To generate

greater management control,

separating the management function
gestion follows the traditional
by creating a new agency.

some suggest

from OMB.89

idea of generating emphasis

It is not needed.

OMB's manage

ment function can be emphasized in other ways,
creasing

88
89

the number

This sug

of management

people

namely,

in

within the

of-

Seidman, Politics, Position, and Power, pp. 74-75.
Ink, "The President as Manager," p. 513.
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Another suggestion

for greater management

emphasis is

recognizing the General Services Administration as a manage
ment agency.

GSA's management role has been ignored.

How

ever, when used, such as in the area of energy conservation,
• 91
it has shown strong leadership.

4.3

BUDGETING FOR CONTROL AND THE NEED FOR DATA
The budget process should not be

crease OMB's
"the

managerial role.

clearest

money.”9
12
9
0
tration.

and

most

lost in a push to in

The budget

discrete

process offers

unit of

analysis--

Analysis is utmost importance to every adminis
They must

be able to analyze what

is being done

and why in order to make

decisions regarding what and where

there should be changes.

Justification of

one

medium

of

information for analysis

expenditures
available

is

to

an

administration.
Each of

the budgeting tools previously mentioned here,

PPBS, MBO, and ZBB,

are based

upon information

either the goals, or operations directed
Their

failures resulted

but rather

in the

not

way they

at goals, or

from what they
were

presidential committment to them,

regarding

instituted,

were

do,

the lack of

and the difficulties the

90 Ink, "The President as Manager," p. 513.
91 Ibid.
92Nathan, The Administrative Presidency, p. 92.
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to

both.

agencies had in using them.
use.

This should not preclude their

A budgeting technique that

the bureaucracies

and

is easy and acceptable to

provides

the administration

desired information is of course

an ideal.

were devised that could come close

with

If some system

to meeting both sides of

the ideal, then the administration, and hopefully subsequent
administrations,

should make a commitment to it,

refining

it where necessary, but allowing the bureaucracies to become
accustomed to it.
Until such

a technique is

must strive to pull out

developed,

administrations

the desired information from agency

budgets in order to gain insight

into what the agencies are

doing.

4.4

THE ROLE OF CIVIL SERVANTS
The importance

presidency cannot
needed.

of the

role of

civil servants

be overemphasized.

Their

to the

allegiance is

However, needing it and getting it are two differ-

ent things.
Assuming that most bureaucrats have

some sense of gen

eral responsibility,

their loyalty may be able to be develOA
. .
oped and channeled.
This loyalty is important:
Control patterns within any organization are made
effective as a result of a willingness on the part
of all members to accept the view that individual9
*
3

93Mackenzie, "Presidential Personnel Administration,' in
Heclo and Salamon, Presidential Government, p. 124.
^Gawthorp, Bureaucratic Behavior, p. 143.
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interests and goals can be satisfied
only if
organizational goals and
interests are real
ized. ...Loyalty is, in effect, an essential,
in
tangible quality which must be present...959
*
7
6
If this
cultivated.

loyalty is to be

developed,

The first step is

bureaucrat and the bureaucracy.
positions to make

major

are forced to become
it,

then it

to distinguish

must be

between the

The individuals are not in

changes

in the

a part of it.96

system,
By being

so they
a part of

they know its strengths and weaknesses and where change

is needed and how to go about it.
One step

toward

developing

careerists feel a part of

loyalty is

to make

the administration.

the

"One of the

best investments a new administration can make is to explain
to the career employees" its objectives.57
is often disregarded as a source
of government.

This is

The bureaucracy

for advice on the "how to"

unfortunate

because

they have

in the SES

is another

the needed knowledge and experience. 98
A strong

use of the careerists

step.

The knowledge

can be

invaluable.

appointed positons

that these people in particular have,
Moving

people

is one possible

from
way of

the

SES

into

utilizing them.

Most important to this point is that those in the SES devel
op the predicted distinction of being separate from the rest

95Gawthorp, Bureaucratic Behavior, p. 131.
96 Ink, "The President as Manager," p. 511.
97 Ibid ., p. 510.
qjo

,

,

Seidman, Politics, Position, and Power, pp. 74-75.
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of the civil service system.

Therefore, they have no alle

giance to any one agency.

4.5

AN ALLY IN CONGRESS
As

mentioned above,

atively towards moves
weaken their
fore,

Congress will often

by the executive which

relationship with the

react

neg

they feel may

bureaucracies.

There

a president must strive to develop a strong relation

ship with them prior to any moves on his part: 99
He

must be

Congress that

able to

develop

will support his

group would be those who serve
bureaucracies on which

constituency

moves.

The

best possible

be exercised.

the "Iron Triangle",

and agencies no

within

on committees related to the

greater control is to

This would act to break up
terests groups

a

where to turn

giving in
for institu

tional support.
Given the nature of
their clientele groups,
possible time that

Congress,

the bureaucracies,

this is unlikely to

a president could gain

happen.

and
One

more support for

his position would be if there were an influx of new members
into Congress who were not yet develop the close working re
lations with the agencies. This, of course, would be a short
term situation.

Further, every president could not count on

a tremendous turnover in Congress.

What is needed from the

president is the use of the presidential power of persuasion9

99 Ink, "The President as Manager," p. 511.
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over certain

members.

"Iron Triangles",

This

is unlikely

but will gain

to break

up the

the president some support

in Congress for his position regarding the bureaucracies.

4.6

PRESIDENTIAL OBJECTIVES
Implicit to

has

certain goals

this discussion is that
that it

wants met

an administration

by the

bureaucracy.

This is not necessarily the case.

For any actions directed

at bureaucratic control

those

to work,

directed toward some objective.
new administration
ble.100

regarding the

actions

Too often,

must

be

the goals of a

bureaucracy are

intangi

Generally the stated goal follows somewhere along

the line of "to make the bureaucracy more efficient."
Goals can provide the "philosophical framework" as well
as more
staffers,

tactical objectives to
and careerists.101

agency heads,
They

White House

are not easily estab

lished and will require time to be developed.
including
ize

many people in

these goals

the process,

and begin

to develop

However,

they can

by

internal

the desired

loyal

ty.1^
What is needed is specified operational

goals.

It is

not unreasonable to prescribe such measureable objectives to
government bureaucracies.103

However,

these

100Heclo, A Government of Strangers, p. 10.
J01Malek, Washington1s Hidden Tradgedy, p. 36.
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objectives

must be designed with the political environment in mind.

4.7

SUMMARY
In review,

several steps toward improving the adminis

trative power of the executive have been listed.
1.

These are:

Reliance on Cabinet Secretaries to manage the depart
ments .

2.

The use of White House staff in an advisory role, not
as administrators.

3.

Greater development of OMB's management function.

4.

The development of a budgeting technique which is ac
ceptable to

bureaucracies and provides

tration with needed information.

the adminis

Until such a tech

nique is developed, each administration must draw out
of the desired information

from each agency's budget

request.
5.

Forming alliances in Congress and within the bureauc
racy.

103 Rose, Managing Presidential Objectives, p. 85.
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Chapter 5
CONCLUSION
Most

of the

"important actions

leaders...are... likely to be toward
government

officials

thing."10^

to

do,

by today's

political

getting large groups of

or

to

stop

doing

some

Control over the activities of the federal gov

ernment is important and necessary.
persist are to what degree should

The questions that will
there be control and what

actors in the process should have the greatest control?
The

presidency offers

the best

medium for

management of the executive branch.105
tial to

offer coordination

against Congress'

and the

many voices.

effective

It has the poten
policy of

"one voice"

Yet, managerial ability has

seldom been a major criteria when people cast their vote for
president.106

However,

right

that

in

iticians

saying

Fred Malek,

"the qualities

unfortunatately seem

is not necessarily
of successful

pol

antithethical to those

of a

good manager."107

l0,itHeclo, A Government of Strangers, p. 1.
l05Ink, "The President as Manager," p. 510.
106Ibid., p. 508.
107Malek, Washington's Hidden Tradgedy, p. 19.
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Management can
available for a

come from

the presidency.

president to act as

executive branch.

These

Tools are

administrator

include the people he

administrate the agencies and

of

the

selects to

departments within the execu

tive branch and the staff of advisors he chooses.

Further,

various administrative techniques are available to the pres
ident.

Each of

these instruments

has

had

some,

though

never complete success.
There exists

many obstacles

to presidential

The time he

has available to devote

ters is one

factor.

his instruments of

Bureaucrats possess

any efforts he makes.
total control.

to administrative mat

The limitation of

control is another.

control.

tools to

reduce

Finally, the system itself, prevents

In part, the system was designed to prevent

total executive control

and,

in

part,

total control

is

limited by natural development of the system.
For a

more effective administrative

must first pay attention to
sors.

role,

presidents

the mistakes of their predeces

The Reagan administration has learned from Carter and

Nixon that the
the daily

White House cannot begin to

functioning of all

get involved in

the agencies under

it.

In

stead, it has been willing to delegate some of the responsi
bility and authority to its appointees and staff.
the same time,

it

maintains

control

at

of what it feels are

the most important details.10** .

l0%Iathan, The Administrative Presidency, p. 12.
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Yet,

It does an administration no
the bureaucracy.

good to abstractly attack

Such attacks have the potential of making

agencies less responsive

and further

confidence in government.^9

eroding the

Instead,

people's

what is needed is

greater cooperation between all involved parties.
Even before this,
cedures

definite,

measurable goals and pro

for meeting those goals must be made.

Actions

to

ward the many executive bureaucracies must be based on some
thing more than an abstract idea of control.

There must be

a definite plan and a rationale behind that plan, otherwise,
"the struggle to control the

bureaucracy is...a leap in the

dark."0
110
9

l09Seidman, Politics, Position, and Power, p. 302.
110Ibid., p. 1.
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